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Abstract 
The EU-sponsored Barcelona conference in 1995 set the ambitious goal of creating the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EUROMED) that would include the European Union and the 
MENA countries by 2010. The intermediate steps towards building the EUROMED have 
involved bilateral “vertical” trade liberalization between the EU and the particular MENA 
countries as well as “horizontal” trade liberalization among themselves. In this paper we 
evaluate empirically the effects of the new EU Association Agreements with the MENA 
countries using the augmented gravity equations derived from a variety of neoclassical and 
new trade theory models and panel data for the period 1980-2004. We find that while these 
agreements increased significantly imports of the MENA countries from the EU they had no 
positive impact on their exports to the EU which can be attributed to the asymmetry in trade 
liberalization between the EU and the MENA countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The inability to achieve far reaching trade liberalization under the auspices of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
led to the proliferation of regional trade agreements in the world trading system. According to 
the WTO convention the term regional trade agreement (RTA) encompasses both reciprocal 
free trade or customs areas as well as plurilateral (multicountry) agreements. During the 
1990s the European Union (EU) was a major player in the RTA game and an active sponsor 
of bilateral association agreements with its closest neighbours located in the Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as in the Middle East and the North Africa (MENA).  
The EU-sponsored Barcelona conference in 1995 set the ambitious goal of 
establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EUROMED) that would include the 
enlarged European Union and the MENA countries by 2010. The creation of the EUROMED 
is to be achieved by means of the new generation of the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements between the EU and the MENA countries accompanied by free trade agreements 
between the MENA countries themselves. In contrast to earlier, mostly non-reciprocal, trade 
liberalization the new Association Agreements provide for the implementation of bilateral 
free trade between the EU and the MENA countries.    
 In this paper we study the trade effects of the new EU Association Agreements for 
bilateral imports and exports of the MENA countries using the augmented gravity equation of 
international trade derived from a variety of neoclassical and new trade models. While there 
exists extensive literature that deals with evaluating empirically the effects of trade 
liberalization between the new and the old EU member states relatively little attention has 
been devoted to studying the effects of trade liberalization between the EU and the MENA 
countries.  
 3
 Two main strands in the empirical trade literature employing gravity models in the 
context of the MENA countries can be distinguished.1 The first, and the most numerous, 
strand concentrates on estimating the trade potential of the MENA countries and predicting 
the volume of trade flows resulting from trade liberalization. Examples that belong to this 
strand include: Arnon et al. (1996), Ekholm et al. (1996), and more recently Nugent and 
Yousef (2005), Broto et al. (2006) and Tovias et al. (2007). Most of these studies find that the  
actual trade of MENA countries is below the predicted values and there exists unexploited 
trade potential. 
Our study is related to the second, more recent strand that studies the ex-post 
consequences of trade liberalization in the MENA countries. This strand compared to the first 
one is still less numerous and the provided empirical evidence seems to be study-specific and 
dependent on the time period chosen. For example, Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) estimated 
the gravity equation using a pooled dataset for 18 Arab countries and their 43 partners during 
the period 1995-1997 to find that the estimated parameters on the dummy variable for the EU 
preferential arrangements were statistically significant but displayed counter-intuitive 
negative signs both in the case of exports and imports.2  
More recently, Peridy (2005) estimated the gravity equation for 7 MENA countries 
and their 42 partner countries using a panel dataset for the period 1975-2001. He found that 
the EU trade preferences granted to the MENA countries increased their exports by about 20-
27% depending on the model specification which evidences a significant gross trade creation. 
However, at the same time he noted that the positive trade preference impact has been steadily 
                                                 
1
 In addition to the gravity model based approach other approaches based on the CGE modeling have been 
extensively used to evaluate welfare effects of trade liberalization in the MENA countries. Examples of studies 
based on this approach include Maskus and Konan (1997), Augier and Gasiorek (2003), and Dennis (2006).  
2
 Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000, p. 12, fn. 8) do not, however, provide a convincing explanations for their findings 
and simply argue that this might be the results of capital flows or the time period chosen. In our view major trade 
liberalization in manufactured goods on the EU side took place much earlier than the period covered by their 
sample and its effects were no longer visible in the 1990s as shown later by Peridy (2005). At the same time the 
negative signs might be interpreted as the evidence of still existing trade restrictions both in the EU and the Arab 
countries. 
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dropping over time. For example, the gross trade creation only from 1980 to 1995 decreased 
from 27.4 to 11.8%.3 
According to Peridy (2005, p.137) “… the conclusion of the EUROMED agreements 
should stop preference erosion in the future, unless the market access of Mediterranean 
agricultural imports remains restricted for a significant period of time”. However, no attempts 
have been made so far to evaluate empirically the effects of the new EU Association 
Agreements concluded with the MENA countries. Therefore, our study attempts to fill in a 
part of the existing gap in this important field of study by assessing empirically whether the 
new EU Association Agreements actually provided a new stimulus to the development of 
trade relations between the EU and the MENA countries. 
 Although the goal of our study may look similar to those of other studies focusing on 
evaluation ex-post effects of trade liberalization that can be found in the literature, three major 
differences with respect to the previous work can be identified. First, we use the generalized 
gravity equation that can be derived from a variety of neoclassical and new trade theory 
models and employ an empirical procedure that allows us to identify the appropriate model 
that explains the trade pattern of the MENA countries. Second, in our study while focusing on 
the effects of the new EU Association Agreements we control also for the effects of other 
both plurilateral and bilateral free trade agreements concluded by the MENA countries among 
themselves as well as with countries located outside the region.  Third, we study the impact of 
the association agreements for both exports and imports separately for particular MENA 
countries as well as for the whole group. 
 We find that while the new EU Association Agreements increased significantly 
imports of the MENA countries from the EU, they did not contribute to the expansion of their 
exports to the EU markets. These findings can be explained by the asymmetry in trade 
                                                 
3
 Peridy (2005) attributes this decrease to three main factors: i) the restrictive EU trade policy regarding MENA 
agricultural export, ii) the removal of the Multifibre Agreement, and iii) the conclusion of the Europe 
Agreements between the EU and Central and Eastern European countries in the early 1990s that eroded MENA 
countries’ trade preferences.   
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liberalization between the EU and the MENA countries. On the one hand, liberalization of the 
EU imports from the MENA countries was a gradual process that extended over the last thirty 
years and there was not much to liberalize in the 1990s except for trade in agricultural goods 
which still remains very restricted. On the other hand, the MENA countries remained 
relatively closed to the EU exports, their initial level of protection was much higher than in 
the EU and liberalization of the MENA imports from the EU took place much faster and its 
scope was much bigger. Moreover, we find that the estimated impact of the new Association 
Agreements on bilateral trade of particular MENA countries differs greatly across the region.   
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief description of 
the history of trade liberalization in the MENA countries and the role of the EU in this 
process. In section 3 we present the analytical framework used for evaluating empirically the 
effects of preferential trade liberalization in the MENA countries. In section 4 variables 
definitions and data sources are described. In section 5 estimation results for the whole 
MENA group as well as for particular countries of the MENA region are presented and 
discussed. Final remarks and policy guidelines are presented in the concluding section. 
 
2. The Euro-Mediterranean Integration Process 
The integration of the MENA countries with the European Union has a long history that 
includes two generations of agreements ranging from unilateral preferences and non-
reciprocal treatment to cooperation and association agreements. The main features of these 
agreements were the EU concessions in trade with the MENA countries. The first generation 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with the selected MENA countries that 
provided free access for their manufactures exports to the EU markets were concluded already 
in the 1960s.4 
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 In addition to liberalization of manufactures goods imports from the associated countries some agricultural 
imports were granted reductions in the common external tariff.   
 6
 However, given the special historic, economic and political interest in the 
Mediterranean region, the European Commission launched in 1972 the Global Mediterranean 
Policy (GMP) that was aimed at providing non-discriminatory trade concessions to all MENA 
countries (Tovias, 1977). The main goal of this policy was to conclude a series of preferential 
trading agreements in industrial products between the EU and each MENA country and to 
offer concessions in agricultural imports to the EU that did not interfere with the European 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 5    
 Countries included in the GMP were the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia), Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), Israel, Libya, Turkey, 
Cyprus, Malta and the former Yugoslavia (Jovanović, 2005).6 The GMP resulted in a series of 
the so-called Cooperation Agreements that were concluded with all the MENA countries 
between 1973 and 1980. The Cooperation Agreements extended earlier preferences for 
MENA exports of agricultural products both in terms of coverage and the margins of 
preference, however, at the same time these exports were subject to protectionist measures 
imposed by the CAP. 
Further liberalization of the EU imports from the MENA countries took place after the 
Southern enlargement in 1986 to include Spain and Portugal whose exports obtained 
unrestricted access to the EU markets. Following this enlargement the EU concluded a new 
series of agreements with the MENA countries called the Adaptation Agreements that were 
aimed at reducing increased tariff discrimination between those Mediterranean countries that 
joined the EU and those that stayed outside. As a result of this renovated policy by the end of 
1993 all tariffs on exports from the MENA countries were eliminated, however, non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to trade related to the CAP were still in force.  
                                                 
5
 Euro-Mediterranean trade liberalization within the framework of the GPM was unilateral except for Israel 
where reciprocity was required. Most MENA markets remained protected by high tariffs until the middle of the 
1990s. 
6
 Greece, Spain and Portugal were also included in this policy before their entry into the EU in two ways of the 
Southern Enlargement that took place in 1981 (Greece) and in 1986 (Spain and Portugal).   
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The new round of trade liberalization between the EU and the MENA countries was 
initiated at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in 
Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995. In the Barcelona Declaration the EU and the MENA 
countries established the main objectives of the Barcelona Process, including the creation of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. The Barcelona Process represents a turning 
point in the trade relations between the EU and the MENA countries as it means replacing the 
previous system of non-reciprocal preferences for most MENA countries by bilateral free 
trade agreements.7  
The Barcelona Process has two complementary dimensions: bilateral and regional. 
The EU carries out a number of activities bilaterally with each country. The most important 
ones are the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that the European Commission 
negotiates individually with particular MENA countries. These new generation agreements 
that replaced the previous Association and Cooperation Agreements signed in the 1960s and 
1970s foresee bilateral trade in manufactured goods and progressive liberalization of trade in 
agricultural products.8 The provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
governing the bilateral relations contain the general principles common to all MENA 
countries as well as specific characteristics that vary across countries. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
  With the conclusion of negotiations with Syria in 2004 the network of bilateral 
Association Agreements with the MENA countries has been completed (see Table 1). After 
the signature the agreements entered a lengthy ratification process by the national parliaments 
                                                 
7
 Included with the EU member states in this potential agreements were the following Mediterranean countries: 
Algeria, Cyprus (the EU member since 2004), Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta (the EU member since 
2004), Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey while Libya has the observer status since 
1999. Together with the EFTA that forms together with the EU the European Economic Area, this zone is 
foreseen to become world’s largest market place that will eventually include about 40 countries and 800 million 
consumers. 
8
 However, the scope of trade liberalization in agricultural products is somewhat limited due to EU’s refusal to 
remove NTBs on agricultural products. The major stumbling blocks in trade relations between the EU and the 
MENA countries was always the fact that they produce very similar agricultural commodities, such as wine, 
olive oil, citrus fruit and vegetables, to the ones produced in Southern Europe, in particular Greece, Italy, 
Southern France and Spain (Jovanović, 2005).   
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of the EU member states and the MENA countries. The Association Agreements came 
progressively into force in Tunisia (1998), Israel (2000), Morocco (2000), Jordan (2002), 
Egypt (2004) and Algeria (2005).9  
The Interim Agreements for early implementation of trade related matters are in force 
in the Palestinian Authority (1997) and Lebanon (2003). Moreover, special agreements 
establishing a customs union with the EU were signed with the European Mediterranean EU 
candidate countries: Cyprus, Malta and Turkey that entered into force before their accession 
into the EU. The EU enlargement on May 1, 2004 brought Cyprus and Malta into the EU, 
whereas the customs union agreement with Turkey (1996) is still in force. 
In addition to “vertical” bilateral trade liberalization with the EU the MENA countries 
are committed to implement “horizontal” trade liberalization among themselves. However, 
compared to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements radical trade liberalization 
between the MENA countries is still lagging behind. Some doubts about the desirability of 
intra-MENA trade liberalization stem from the long history of failure in creating a well 
functioning plurilateral free trade agreement. 
Commonly mentioned examples of such failure stories include the Arab Common 
Market and other initiatives of the Arab League and the Council of Economic Unity, as well 
as various sub-regional arrangements such as among Maghreb countries, and many other 
trade agreements formed among countries of the MENA region. According to Nugent and 
Yousef (2005, p.1) “Not only have these special arrangements been far from fully realized, 
but also even normal trade among countries of the region has been periodically and 
unexpectedly interrupted by trade boycotts, ad hoc border closings and so on.”  
 Given the lack of significant progress in liberalizing trade at the regional and sub-
regional levels in the MENA region some countries located both in the Middle East and North 
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 The implementation of the trade part of the Association Agreement with Israel started on January 1, 1996. In 
our econometric study presented further in the subsequent section we also used year 1989 as the date when 
unilateral liberalization of Israeli imports of manufactured goods from the EU took place, however, the 
estimation results were very similar.    
 9
Africa decided to liberalize their trade on a bilateral basis. This led to the establishment of the 
network of bilateral trade agreements by the end of the 1990s that prepared the ground for the 
Agadir Declaration signed in 2001 by the representatives of four MENA countries: Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The Agadir Declaration included a commitment to the 
establishment of a free trade area (FTA) between these countries that remained open onto 
other Arab countries.10 
 In 2003 the four member countries of the Agadir group finalized the agreement on the 
establishment of a free trade area among themselves that would replace the existing bilateral 
trade agreements of the 1990s. The Agadir Agreement was signed in 2004 and was initially 
foreseen to take effect in 2005. However, due to the slow ratification process by some 
countries it has not entered into force until 2007.11 
The Agadir Agreement is often perceived as a stepping stone to the formation of a 
well functioning regional trade agreement that would complement on-going “vertical” trade 
liberalization with the EU and eventually lead to the creation of the EUROMED. However, at 
this stage it is too early to evaluate its effectiveness. Nevertheless, it is possible to evaluate 
empirically at least the effectiveness of earlier bilateral trade agreements concluded among 
the MENA countries that laid the foundations for the Agadir Agreement. Therefore, in 
addition to studying the effects of the new EU Association Agreements we also study the 
effects of bilateral trade agreements of the Agadir countries concluded in the late 1990s. 
  
3. The Analytical Framework          
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 Lebanon and Syria are currently in the process of negotiations to join the Agadir Organization. Other potential 
entrants include Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and the Palestinian Authority. 
11
 The declared goals of the Agadir Agreement in addition to the elimination of tariffs include also 
harmonization of laws in economic matters and coordination of sectoral and global economic policies, especially 
in the fields of international trade, agriculture, industry, finance, taxes and customs. A key element of the Agadir 
Agreement is the adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean Protocol on the rules of origin that allow MENA countries 
to benefit from the diagonal cumulation of value added. In contrast to the US rules of origin that consider value 
added domestically in the country that exports to the US this means that it turns the blind eye to where value was 
added for the purpose of preferential tariffs as long as it was in an FTA partner country. These conflicting 
regimes give the EU an advantage in its competition with the US to a secure the Euro-Mediterranean FTA as a 
counter force to the US-Middle East FTA.   
 10
To assess the effects of various preferential trading agreements concluded by the MENA 
countries we use a gravity equation of bilateral trade flows in its extended form that can be 
derived from a variety of neoclassical and new trade theory models. The gravity equation has 
been widely used in empirical studies of economic integration processes to investigate the 
changes in the geographic trade pattern and the effects of RTAs or currency unions on trade 
flows. However, most previous empirical studies employ the gravity equation in its simplified 
form that assumes complete specialization in production either at the country or the firm level 
and foresees no role for factor proportions. These simplistic equations predict that trade 
between two countries depends only on their economic size and trade costs between them.  
In our view, while such equations may be appropriate for explaining trade flows 
between developed countries where most trade takes place in differentiated manufactured 
products, they cannot be regarded as fully satisfactory in explaining trade flows of the MENA 
countries which are on averaged still at the relatively low level of economic development and 
trade in homogenous goods constitutes an important part of their aggregate trade flows. 
Therefore, the estimates of the effects of RTAs obtained on the basis of such equations may 
be seriously biased due to the lack of controls for factor proportions that play a key role in the 
determination of trade flows in the incomplete specialization models especially when they are 
estimated for the middle- or low-income countries (Cieślik, 2007).  
Moreover, in contrast to previous studies our empirical approach allows discriminating 
among alternative theories of international trade developed to explain the empirical success of 
the gravity equation.12 Our generalized estimating equation that encompasses specific 
estimating equations derived from a variety of theoretical models can be expressed in the 
logarithmic form as follows: 
                                                 
12
 This problem was first addressed by Evenett and Keller (2002) who developed an empirical procedure to 
discriminate among competing models that may provide theoretical foundations for the gravity equation. 
However, unlike Evenett and Keller (2002) we employ a alternative model identification procedure based on the 
signs and statistical significance of the estimated parameters on the factor proportion variables that is in our view 
more robust than the one proposed by Evenett and Keller (2002). 
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lnTijt = ∑
=
n
k
k
1
β RTAijt + α1lnYit + α2lnYjt + α3lnKit/Lit + α4lnKjt/Ljt + α5lnDISTANCEij + 
α6CONTIGUITYij + α7ARABICij + α8TURKISHij + α9COLONYij + α10COLONIZERij + ui + 
uj + uij + vt + εijt.          (1)  
where: Tijt is the value of trade flows (exports and imports, respectively) between countries i 
and j in year t; RTAijt is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j are both the 
members of a bilateral or a plurilateral regional preferential trading agreement in year t;13 Yit 
and Yjt are the levels of GDP in countries i and j in year t, respectively; Kit/Lit and Kjt/Ljt are 
the capital per worker stocks in countries i and j in year t, respectively; DISTANCEij is the 
distance between countries i and j; CONTIGUITYij is a dummy variable indicating whether 
countries i and j share a common border; ARABICij and TURKISHij is are two dummy 
variables indicating whether countries i and j share a common language; COLONYij is a 
dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j were in a colonial relationship; 
COLONIZERij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j shared a common 
colonizer; ui and uj are the individual fixed effects for countries i and j, respectively; uij is the 
country-pair specific effect; vt is the time specific effect, and εijt is the error term that satisfies 
the standard properties.  
 The preferential trading agreements once implemented are expected to increase 
bilateral trade of both trading partners in the case of reciprocity, hence βi > 0 for all effective 
agreements. All theoretical models predict that trade flows should increase with the economic 
size of both trading partners, hence α1, α2 > 0. However, the impact of the factor proportion 
variables cannot be a priori determined as it varies across various theoretical models and 
could be either positive, negative or none depending of the extent of product differentiation.14 
                                                 
13
 The year of entry into force of a preferential trade agreement is used as a starting year for an RTA dummy 
variable. 
14
 For example, the standard Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model with homogenous goods predicts that bilateral 
imports of the capital-abundant country increase with its capital-labor ratio and decrease with capital-labor ratio 
of the trading partner. In the Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin (C-H-O) model proposed by Helpman (1981) where 
one good is homogenous and the other differentiated bilateral imports of the capital-abundant country also 
increase with its capital-labor ratio while the capital-labor ratio of the trading partner does not play any role in 
 12
 In particular, if both estimated parameters on the factor proportion variables display 
opposite signs and are statistically significant then trade of the MENA countries is explained 
by the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model with incomplete specialization in production. If only 
one of estimated parameters on factor proportion variables shows a positive sign and is 
statistically significant then their trade is explained by the Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin 
model which is a hybrid of the H-O and monopolistic competition models.  
Finally, if none of the estimated parameters on the factor proportion variables is 
statistically significant then their trade is explained by one of complete specialization models: 
the H-O or C-H-O models with complete specialization in production at the country level or 
the pure monopolistic competition model with complete specialization at the firm level.15 
Therefore, the signs of the estimated parameters on the factor proportion variables α3 , α4 and 
their statistical significance have to be determined empirically to identify the appropriate 
theoretical model that explains trade of the MENA countries.. 
Moreover, we expect trade flows to be negatively related to distance that serves as a 
proxy for transportation costs which should be low when countries are located close to each 
other, hence α5 < 0. Common border and language indicator variables also serve as proxy for 
transaction costs which should be lowered when trading partners share a common border or 
speak a common language, therefore α6, α7, α8 > 0. The colonial ties serve as proxies for 
historical ties and should positively influence bilateral trade flows, hence α9, α10 > 0. 
 
4. The Definitions of the Variables and the Data Sources 
Our dependent variables used in the estimating equation (1) are bilateral exports and imports 
of seven MENA countries that are the most advanced in liberalizing their trade with the EU as 
                                                                                                                                                        
determination of the volume of imports. Finally, in the monopolistic competition model where all goods are 
differentiated capital-labor ratios have no impact on the volume of trade.  
15
 If this is the case then we need to consider alternative models that assume complete specialization either at the 
country or the firm level which lead to the same gravity equation (Deardorff, 1998). In this case the share of 
intra-industry trade can be used as an identification criterion to discriminate between alternative models (Evenett 
and Keller, 2002).   
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well as with each other. These include four North African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia, and three countries located in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan and Turkey. The 
sample choice has been determined by data availability. The trade flows data comes from the 
UN COMTRADE database and is expressed in the constant US dollars in 2000 prices. The 
trade data is available for 196 trading partners and covers the period of 1980-2004. This 
yields a total of almost 19 thousand observations. However, due to many missing 
observations our panel is unbalanced. 
 Our main explanatory variables include dummy variables indicating the new EU 
Association Agreements as well as dummy variables indicating the bilateral trade agreements 
between the Agadir countries discussed in detail in Section 2 that were in force for the time 
span covered by our sample. In addition to this in our study we control also for potential 
effects of other preferential trading agreements concluded by the MENA countries. These 
include: the EFTA agreements, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Arab Cooperation Council, 
various bilateral agreements between MENA countries as well as bilateral agreements with 
the EU associated states (now new EU member countries) in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the NAFTA countries: Canada, Mexico and the US.16  
 Most MENA countries in addition to the EU Association Agreements concluded at 
about the same time also free trade agreements with the EFTA countries that along with the 
EU form the European Economic Area since 1994. The EFTA agreements with the MENA 
countries that were in force during the period covered by our sample include Turkey (1992), 
Israel (1993), Morocco (1999), and Jordan (2002).17 In addition to the bilateral trade 
agreement between Israel and Turkey that is in force since 1997 these two countries 
                                                 
16
 In our study we take into account potential effects of preferential trading agreements at different stages of their 
implementation as some of these agreements despite their entry into force have not been fully implemented yet 
and much of the liberalizing effort is still to come. 
17
 In addition to these, the EFTA concluded also other agreements with the MENA countries that include Tunisia 
(2005), the Palestinian Authority (1999), and Lebanon (2007). The agreement concluded with Egypt has not 
entered into force yet. 
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concluded a number of bilateral agreements with the CEE countries most of which joined the 
EU in two subsequent waves of enlargement in 2004 and 2007.  
Israeli free trade agreements with the CEE that entered into force include the 
agreements with the Czech and Slovak Republics (1997), Hungary (1998), Poland (1998), 
Slovenia (1998), Romania (2001) and Bulgaria (2002). Turkish free trade agreements with the 
CEE countries that entered into force include the Czech and Slovak Republics (1998), Estonia 
(1998), Lithuania (1998), Hungary (1998), Romania (1998), Bulgaria (1999), Latvia (2000), 
Poland (2000), Slovenia (2000) and Croatia (2003).18    
 In our study we control also for the potential effects of plurilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements concluded among the MENA countries. The plurilateral agreements include the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC). These are two sub-
regional agreements established in 1989 in the MENA region. The AMU includes five North 
African countries: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia while the ACC includes 
four countries located in the Middle East: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen. Although none of 
these agreements was perceived as a successful in achieving trade liberalization the inclusion 
of AMU and ACC dummy variables allows controlling for regional differences between two 
main groups of countries in the MENA region: Maghreb and Mashreq.19 
 Given the failure of plurilateral trade liberalization at the sub-regional level some of 
the MENA countries decided to pursue trade liberalization on a bilateral basis. This resulted 
in a series of bilateral agreements concluded both between the MENA countries as well as 
                                                 
18
 In addition to these Turkey concluded also bilateral agreements with the Balkan countries that emerged from 
the former Yugoslavia. These include the FTA with the FYR of Macedonia that entered into force in 2000 and 
was followed by the entry into force of the FTA with Bosnia-Hercegovina in 2003. 
19
 The AMU was concluded with the aim to “…work gradually towards the realization of the freedom of 
movement of people, goods, services and capital” (Banks, 1995; p. 1030). The AMU was supposed to revive the 
old idea of regional integration in the Maghreb countries proposed already in the 1960s in the form of the 
Maghreb Customs Union (MCU) that was never implemented. However, despite the declared ambitious goals of 
the AMU that included the establishment of the free trade area in 1992, a common market by 2000 and 
eventually a monetary union, in 1993 leaders of the Maghreb countries agreed to postpone the discussion of the 
integration issues. Similar to the AMU, the ACC was formed in response to the slow pace of trade liberalization 
in the Arab countries and its intention was to revive regional integration in the Middle East proposed also in the 
1960s in the form of the Arab Common Market (ACM) that has never been implemented despite some partial 
trade liberalization between 1965 and 1971. Similar to the AMU, also the ACC did not manage to achieve its the 
original goal of creating a sub-regional common market as a result of the political crisis that followed Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990s. 
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with the countries outside the region. In this respect the most active countries in the region 
were Egypt and Jordan that liberalized trade not only among themselves but also with other 
MENA countries including two other future members of the Agadir group: Tunisia and 
Morocco, as well as with other Arab countries.20  
  Finally, to complete the analysis of the impact of bilateral free trade agreements we 
also control for the agreements concluded by some MENA countries with the North American 
countries that formed the NAFTA. The agreements that were in force during the period of our 
investigation include the agreements concluded by Israel with the US (1985), Canada (1997) 
and Mexico (2000) as well as the agreement concluded by Jordan with the US (2001). 
 Our main control variables derived from the trade theory include two types of 
variables. The first refers to economic country size measures while the second to the measures 
of factor proportions. The country size is measured using the data on trading partners’ GDPs 
expressed in constant 2000 US dollars and evaluated in the PPP terms to assure their cross 
country comparability. The GDP data comes from the World Development Indicators 2006 
(WDI) database compiled and published on a CD-ROM by the World Bank in Washington. 
Unfortunately, the data on capital per worker is not available neither for the MENA 
countries and nor for the majority of their trading partners. Therefore, in our study we 
approximate capital-labor ratios in trading partners with their per capita GDP.21 Data on GDP 
per capita also comes from the WDI CD-ROM and is expressed in constant 2000 US dollars 
and evaluated in PPP terms to enable its cross-country comparability. To test for the 
robustness of our estimates we also use land to labor ratios that are calculated as the ratios of 
areable land to total population. Both variables also come from the WDI CD-ROM. 
                                                 
20
 These four future members of the Agadir group by the end of the 1990s have established a network of bilateral 
trade agreements among themselves most of which entered into force in 1999. In addition to these agreements 
we take into account in our study also other agreements that entered into force concluded by Egypt with Syria 
(1991), and by Jordan with United Arab Emirates (2001), Bahrain (2002), Syria (2002), Sudan (2004). Other 
agreements that were in force but whose effectiveness cannot be verified empirically due to the lack of data 
include the agreements concluded by Egypt with Libya (1991), Lebanon (1995) and Iraq (2001), and by Jordan 
with Kuwait (2002) and Lebanon (2003). 
21
 The previous empirical research, for example studies by Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Evenett and 
Keller (2002), shows that capital per worker and GDP per capita are highly correlated.  
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 The remaining control variables include proxies for transportation and transaction 
costs. Distance between trading partners is measured as simple geographic “as the crow flies” 
distance between their capital cities and is expressed in kilometers. Distance data comes from 
the CEPII database available online at www.cepii.fr. In addition to the simple geographic 
proximity of trading partners we also include a dummy variable for the existence of a 
common border that takes the value 1 when countries share a common border, zero otherwise.  
Following other studies we also include two dummy variables for a common language 
of trading partners. Language differences are often regarded as a major non-tariff barrier to 
trade. Since Arabic is the official language in all countries in the MENA region except Turkey 
we use a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if Arabic is an official language in the partner 
country and zero otherwise. For Turkey we define a special dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if Turkish is an official language in the partner country and zero otherwise.22  Finally, to 
control for historical ties we include two dummy variables indicating whether trading 
countries were in a colonial relationship or had a common colonizer. Language and historical 
ties data also comes from the CEPII database available online at www.cepii.fr. The summary 
statistics are provided in the Appendix. 
 
5. Empirical results 
In this section we present two sets of empirical results based on estimating equation (1) that 
include the averaged estimates for the whole MENA sample as well as the estimates obtained 
separately for particular MENA countries. 
 
5.1. Estimates for the whole MENA sample 
The estimation results for the whole MENA sample obtained using different estimation 
methods are reported in Table 2. The baseline estimates for bilateral imports and bilateral 
                                                 
22
 The only country except Turkey where Turkish is an official language is Cyprus. 
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exports of the MENA countries obtained using the fixed effects estimation method that allows 
controlling for country-pair specific effects as well as individual time effects for particular 
years of our sample are reported in columns (1) and (4), respectively.23 The estimation results 
show that both in the case of imports and exports of the MENA countries the estimated 
parameters on the indicator variables for the new EU Association Agreements are statistically 
significant already at the 1 percent level.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
However, while the estimated parameter on the EU dummy in the case of imports 
displays a positive sign, it is negative in the case of exports. This finding confirms the 
frequently expressed opinion that while the new EU Association Agreements provided a new 
stimulus to the development of trade between the EU and the MENA countries it was only 
due to the opening of the MENA markets to the manufactured goods produced in the EU. The 
negative sign on the EU dummy variable in the case of MENA exports to the EU clearly 
indicates the presence of barriers to trade on the EU side as trade in agricultural goods in 
which the MENA countries have a comparative advantage still remains very restricted. 
Very similar results can be reported for the case of free trade agreements concluded 
with the EFTA countries where trade in agricultural goods has not also been liberalized. 
Interestingly, in the case of free trade agreements concluded by Israel and Turkey with the 
Central and Eastern European EU candidate countries the estimated parameters on the CEE 
dummy both in the case of imports and exports are statistically significant and display 
positive signs.24      
                                                 
23
 The F-test for time specific effects confirms the appropriateness of including time dummies for particular 
years of our sample, while the Hausman test advocates the use of fixed effects instead of random effects in all 
estimated regressions for the whole MENA sample.  
24
 This result might be due to the fact that while trade liberalization with Western Europe was a gradual process 
that extended over several decades trade with Central and Eastern European countries that remained isolated 
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The parameter estimates on the intra-MENA agreements are mostly not statistically 
significant, which confirms the general view that trade between these countries still remains 
restricted, although some exceptions can be identified. In particular, among the plurilateral 
intra-MENA agreements only the parameter on the Arab Maghreb Union dummy variable is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level both in the case of imports and exports. 25  
Among the bilateral intra-MENA agreements only the parameters on Israel-Turkey agreement 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and only in the case of imports. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the estimated parameters on both factor proportion 
variables and statistically significant at the 1 percent level and display the opposite signs. This 
finding supports the general view that the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model with incomplete 
specialization in production does well in explaining foreign trade of the MENA countries 
which is still dominated by the inter-industry rather than intra-industry exchange. 
The robustness of our baseline estimates is subsequently investigated in the remaining 
columns of Table 2. It has been frequently argued that the fixed effects estimation method that 
controls for country-pair specific effects might not be fully correct and specific effects 
separately for trading countries must be taken into account (Matyas, 1997). The estimation 
results obtained via the two-way fixed effects estimation method for imports and exports of 
the MENA countries are reported in columns (2) and (5), respectively. However, compared to 
the baseline results presented in columns (1) and (4), very little difference can be seen and our 
major conclusions concerning the signs and statistical significance of the estimated 
parameters remain unchanged.    
Finally, in columns (3) and (6) we report the estimation results for imports and 
exports, respectively, obtained using two-way fixed effects for the specification where the 
                                                                                                                                                        
from the world economy for almost fifty years after the World War II has been liberalized only recently which 
led to substantial trade creation.  
25
 This result is surprising given the fact that the Arab Maghreb Union was never fully implemented. Perhaps, 
our dummy variable for the Arab Maghreb Union captures some other effects common to these countries, such 
as political and cultural proximity, the positively affect their bilateral trade flows which we were not able to 
control for using the standard set of explanatory variables.  
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factor proportions were expressed as land to labor ratios instead of GDP per capita and the 
GDP series for both trading countries were expressed in first differences to address the non-
stationarity problem. However, these changes in the specification of our estimating equation 
had no impact on our major conclusions. This means that the EU countries, at least in the 
short-run, are the main beneficiaries of the new EU Association Agreements and the pattern 
of trade of the MENA countries can be well explained by the standard Heckscher-Ohlin 
model.       
 
 
5.2. Estimates for particular MENA countries 
To gain a deeper insight into what drives our empirical results we split our sample into seven 
sub-samples for the particular MENA countries and estimate the gravity equations for their 
bilateral exports and imports separately for each country using the fixed effects estimator that 
allows controlling for the individual fixed effects for the partner country.26 The estimation 
results for bilateral imports of the individual MENA countries are presented in Table 3 while 
for bilateral exports in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 We find that the estimated trade effects of the new EU Association Agreements are not 
the same for all MENA countries and significant heterogeneity between them exists. In the 
case of bilateral imports we obtained positive and statistically significant coefficients of the 
indicator variables for the new EU Association Agreements only for Morocco, Tunisia and 
Turkey. The estimated parameters on the EU dummy variable were not statistically significant 
for Israel and Turkey, while for Egypt the estimated parameter was statistically significant but 
displayed a negative sign.27 
                                                 
26
 Time dummies are not included due to the perfect collinearity with the reporting country’s GDP.  
27
 These results are not surprising given the fact that the EU Association Agreements with Jordan (2002) and 
Egypt (2004) went into force only recently and it is well known that the effects of free trade agreements are not 
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 In the case of bilateral exports all estimated parameters on the EU dummy variables 
display negative signs and the majority of them are statistically significant. The estimated 
parameters are not statistically significant only for Egypt and Jordan - the countries that 
concluded their association agreements with the EU only recently and are the least integrated 
with the EU among the MENA countries as measured by the shares of their exports to the EU 
in their total exports. 
 Very similar results can be reported also for free trade agreements concluded with the 
EFTA countries. In the case of imports the only statistically significant and positive parameter 
estimate on the EFTA dummy variable is reported for Morocco while for the other countries 
parameter estimates are not statistically significant. In the case of exports all estimated 
parameters on this variable display negative signs and the majority of them are statistically 
significant.     
 Interestingly, all the estimated coefficients on the indicator variables for free trade 
agreements with the Central and Eastern European EU candidate countries display positive 
signs both in the case of imports and exports and are statistically significant except for Israel 
in the case of exports. The estimated coefficient on the NAFTA dummy variable display 
negative signs in most cases but not all of them are statistically significant. The only positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on the NAFTA variable is reported for Jordan and only 
in the case of exports. 
 The parameter estimates obtained for intra-MENA plurilateral agreements always 
display positive signs but not all of them are statistically significant while in the case of 
bilateral intra-MENA agreements, especially those concluded by the future members of the 
Agadir group many parameters display negative signs and are highly statistically significant 
which evidences existing barriers to trade.       
                                                                                                                                                        
immediate and often come with a few year delay from the dates of their entry into force. In the case of Israel 
most trade with the EU was liberalized a long time ago and  no additional stimulus was provided in the 1990s.   
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 Summing up, these empirical results generally support the commonly made claims that 
trade liberalization among the MENA countries in the form of bilateral trade agreements that 
preceded the Agadir Agreement was insufficient and its effectiveness can be called into 
question. Nevertheless, we were able to demonstrate that they allowed at least some MENA 
countries, although not necessarily the future members of the Agadir group, to increase their 
bilateral trade flows.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have studied the effectiveness of the recent EU-sponsored trade liberalization 
in the MENA countries. We have found that while trade liberalization with the EU in the form 
of new Association Agreements was on average effective in raising their bilateral imports 
from the EU at the same time they did not contribute positively to the expansion of their 
exports to the EU. The negative and statistically significant coefficients on the EU indicator 
variables evidence the presence of trade restrictions on the MENA exports to the EU. This 
suggests that the EU member states are the main beneficiaries of the new EU Association 
Agreements, due to the opening of the MENA markets to industrial products from the EU 
while keeping the EU markets closed to imports of agricultural goods from the MENA 
countries.28  
Regrettably, the new Association Agreements did not bring any significant progress in 
the field of trade liberalization in agricultural goods in which the MENA countries have 
comparative advantage and where a strong unexploited trade potential exists. Moreover, the 
EU continues to subsidize its agricultural production through the costly and inefficient CAP 
which counterbalances comparative advantage of the MENA countries and by preventing full 
exploitation of the gains from trade hurts their economic development. Therefore, if the new 
                                                 
28
 The effects of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements on the third countries are not clear and deserve closer 
attention in future empirical studies. In particular, it is not clear whether the increase in the MENA imports from 
the EU comes at the expense of the suppliers of manufactured goods located in other OECD countries that did 
not conclude free trade agreements with the MENA countries. For example, Tovias (1997) argues that a part of 
the increase of imports from the EU may represent trade diversion against other OECD countries. 
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Association Agreements are to exert a symmetric impact on bilateral trade flows between the 
EU and the MENA countries the EU countries should make their markets more open to 
agricultural imports from the MENA countries and allow them compete on an even playing 
field.  
Another important issue is that vertical “hub and spoke” trade liberalization between 
the EU and the MENA countries in the form of Association Agreements if not complemented 
by horizontal trade liberalization among the MENA countries themselves might have adverse 
effects for the location and development of their industrial activity leading to increased 
unemployment  in these countries as suggested by some new economic geography models.29 
Therefore, future empirical studies should address this important issue by looking at the 
impact of asymmetric trade liberalization on investment creation and investment diversion in 
the MENA countries.30 
Moreover, while the majority of the EU Association Agreements have already entered 
into force horizontal trade liberalization among the MENA countries is still lagging behind. 
Therefore, it is to be hoped that the EU Association Agreements will spur far reaching trade 
liberalization in the MENA countries resulting in the creation of the regional FTA that would 
counterbalance or at least reduce the impact of “hub and spoke” trade liberalization with the 
EU. The Agadir Agreement is frequently seen as a stepping stone to the formation of such a 
regional trading agreement. However, given the delays in its implementation it is too early to 
evaluate its effectiveness. Therefore, trade liberalization among the Agadir group member 
countries deserves closer attention in future empirical studies.  
 
                                                 
29
 See for example Puga and Venables (1997). Although their insights turned out not to be robust with respect to 
model assumptions as demonstrated in Baldwin et al. (2003) the potential threat still exists. 
30
 For example, Jovanović (2005, p.550) notices that “In spite of various good intentions, talks, meetings, 
declarations, hopes and promises EU private investors are not much interested in Southern Mediterranean 
countries”.   
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Table 1. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
Country Signature date Entry into force 
Algeria 22.04.2002 01.09.2005 
Egypt 25.06.2001 01.06.2004 
Israel 20.11.1995 01.06.2000 
Jordan 24.11.1997 01.05.2002 
Lebanon 17.06.2002 In process of ratification 
(Interim Agreement for early 
implementation of trade 
measures in force since 
01.03.2003) 
Morocco 26.02.1996 01.03.2000 
Palestinian Authority 24.02.1997 01.07.1997 
(Interim association 
agreement) 
Syria Negotiations concluded 
awaiting for signature 
 
Tunisia 17.07.1995 01.03.1998 
Turkey 06.03.1995 31.12.1995 
Source: European Commission (2007). 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/med_ass_agreements.htm 
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Table 2 Pooled panel estimates 
 
Import Export 
COEFFICIENT FE 2FE D2FE FE 2FE D2FE 
EU-Association Agreement 0.247*** 0.347*** 0.375*** -0.170** -0.196* -0.151 
 
[0.079] [0.092] [0.085] [0.083] [0.10] [0.095] 
EFTA 0.337** 0.971*** 0.886*** -0.337* 0.129 0.157 
 
[0.17] [0.18] [0.17] [0.17] [0.20] [0.19] 
AMU 0.617*** 0.156 -0.160 0.982*** 1.039*** 0.731*** 
 
[0.22] [0.20] [0.19] [0.22] [0.21] [0.20] 
ACC 0.830 0.395 0.269 0.887 0.482 0.269 
 
[0.73] [0.88] [0.82] [0.76] [0.96] [0.91] 
Israel-Turkey 1.328*** 1.912*** 1.906*** 0.814* 0.576 0.688 
 
[0.42] [0.46] [0.43] [0.44] [0.50] [0.47] 
Jordan-Morocco 1.083** 0.706 0.429 0.526 0.708 0.542 
 
[0.46] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.57] [0.54] 
Morocco-Tunisia -0.432 0.734 0.979* -0.990** -0.589 -0.359 
 
[0.47] [0.54] [0.50] [0.49] [0.59] [0.56] 
Egypt-Syria -0.113 0.384 0.682 -0.559 0.775 1.097** 
 
[0.46] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.56] [0.53] 
Egypt-Jordan 0.567 0.445 0.328 -0.0428 -0.119 -0.0539 
 
[0.47] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.57] [0.54] 
Egypt-Morocco 0.972** 0.357 0.420 0.558 1.033* 1.119** 
 
[0.46] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.56] [0.54] 
Jordan-Tunisia 0.0109 0.772 0.731 -0.578 0.521 0.595 
 
[0.46] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.57] [0.54] 
Other Arab FTAS 0.413 0.435 0.335 0.627** 0.572* 0.727** 
 
[0.28] [0.30] [0.28] [0.29] [0.33] [0.31] 
FTAS with CEECs 0.604*** 0.554*** 0.532*** 0.720*** 0.584*** 0.560*** 
 
[0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.19] [0.20] [0.20] 
FTAS with American Partners -0.0915 0.751** 0.756*** 0.439 0.513 0.633** 
 
[0.36] [0.31] [0.29] [0.38] [0.34] [0.32] 
Yi (partner) 1.499*** 1.140*** -0.0120 1.819*** 1.188*** 0.276 
 
[0.15] [0.19] [0.27] [0.16] [0.20] [0.28] 
Yj (reporting) 0.792*** -0.373 1.563*** 2.174*** 1.977*** -0.446 
 
[0.27] [0.32] [0.38] [0.29] [0.36] [0.42] 
K/Li (partner) -0.217 0.0828 -0.523*** -0.957*** -0.337* -0.587*** 
 
[0.15] [0.18] [0.11] [0.15] [0.19] [0.12] 
K/Lj (reporting)  1.369*** 1.955*** 0.562*** 0.692*** 0.845*** -0.00933 
 
[0.21] [0.25] [0.14] [0.24] [0.28] [0.16] 
DISTANCEij 
 
-0.802*** -0.831*** 
 
-1.490*** -1.543*** 
  
[0.044] [0.043] 
 
[0.047] [0.047] 
CONTIGUITYij 
 
0.794*** 0.804*** 
 
-0.0523 -0.0624 
  
[0.11] [0.11] 
 
[0.12] [0.12] 
COLONYij 
 
0.301*** 0.260** 
 
0.673*** 0.648*** 
  
[0.11] [0.10] 
 
[0.12] [0.11] 
COLONIZERij 
 
0.686*** 0.826*** 
 
0.457*** 0.499*** 
  
[0.059] [0.061] 
 
[0.061] [0.063] 
ARABICij 
 
0.856*** 0.683*** 
 
0.915*** 0.799*** 
  
[0.057] [0.058] 
 
[0.058] [0.060] 
TURKISHij 
 
-1.737*** -1.342*** 
 
-0.794* -0.418 
  
[0.41] [0.40] 
 
[0.43] [0.41] 
Constant -57.90*** -21.80*** 17.27 -88.90*** -62.51*** 11.79*** 
  [6.17] [7.18] [30165] [6.47] [7.78] [1.10] 
Observations 18577 18577 15972 18839 18839 16272 
R-squared 0.47 0.74 0.75 0.36 0.67 0.69 
Hausmann 1290*** 
  
93.71*** 
  F test FE 19.89*** 38.74*** 194.5*** 20.48*** 26.79*** 149.5*** 
F test TD 4.456*** 2.116*** 5.502*** 6.592*** 3.298*** 8.717** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
FE – fixed effects (pairs), 2FE – fixed effects for reporting and partner country. D2FE specifications include GDP expressed in 
changes, arable land per capita as K/L proxy and fixed effects for reporting and partner country. All specifications include time 
dummies (TD) 
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Table 3 Individual country fixed effects estimates for bilateral imports 
COEFFICIENT Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Morocco Tunisia Turkey 
EU-Association Agreement 
 
-0.219** -0.459*** 0.113 0.288*** 0.302*** 0.161* 
  
[0.11] [0.099] [0.097] [0.097] [0.10] [0.096] 
EFTA 
  
-0.274** -0.497 0.790*** 
 
-0.172 
   
[0.14] [0.46] [0.30] 
 
[0.16] 
AMU 0.857 
   
1.314** 0.290 
 
 
[0.61] 
   
[0.53] [0.34] 
 ACC 
 
1.249*** 
 
0.338* 
   
  
[0.38] 
 
[0.19] 
   Israel-Turkey 
  
1.631*** 
   
0.371** 
   
[0.19] 
   
[0.15] 
Jordan-Morocco 
   
0.577*** 1.344*** 
  
    
[0.19] [0.51] 
  Morocco-Tunisia 
    
-0.452 -0.243 
 
     
[0.28] [0.19] 
 Egypt-Syria 
 
0.464** 
   
0.183 
 
  
[0.19] 
   
[0.14] 
 Egypt-Jordan 
 
0.714** 
 
0.595** 
   
  
[0.33] 
 
[0.29] 
   Egypt-Morocco 
 
1.117*** 
  
1.011*** 
  
  
[0.22] 
  
[0.25] 
  Jordan-Tunisia 
   
-0.837*** 
 
1.342** 
 
    
[0.27] 
 
[0.57] 
 Other Arab FTAS 
 
0.879*** 
 
0.484** -0.522 
  
  
[0.31] 
 
[0.22] [0.56] 
  FTAS with CEECs 
  
-0.158 
   
0.255* 
   
[0.12] 
   
[0.13] 
FTAS with American Partners 
  
-0.612*** -0.210** -0.191 
  
   
[0.099] [0.093] [0.14] 
  Yi (partner) 3.043*** 1.648*** -0.901* 1.376*** 1.231*** 1.787*** 0.586 
 
[0.51] [0.33] [0.48] [0.35] [0.41] [0.48] [0.50] 
Yj (reporting) -3.031*** -0.767 0.774 -0.478** 0.374 -0.691 -1.931** 
 
[0.51] [0.80] [0.65] [0.22] [0.73] [0.59] [0.92] 
K/Li (partner) -1.528*** -0.936*** 2.778*** -0.279 -0.327 -0.180 0.798* 
 
[0.47] [0.33] [0.47] [0.34] [0.41] [0.44] [0.48] 
K/Lj (reporting)  6.083*** 1.001 1.686 2.017*** 0.262 0.0805 7.110*** 
 
[0.69] [1.47] [1.32] [0.37] [1.35] [0.95] [1.51] 
Constant -21.62*** -12.77 -37.56*** -29.81*** -30.67*** -19.82*** -31.23*** 
  [7.74] [8.16] [3.27] [5.38] [5.72] [7.50] [8.09] 
Observations 2597 2782 2402 2351 2779 2730 2936 
R-squared 0.78 0.85 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.83 0.86 
Hausman 7.931 16.11 
 
1.611 10.87 
  F test FE 95833*** 117.3*** 3418*** 169330*** 3812*** 1160*** 612.6*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets, .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include fixed effects for partner country. The time dummies are not included due to obvious collinearity with 
reporting country GDP. Missing Hausman statistics indicate non positive definite matrix of coefficient differences used for 
testing 
 
 28
Table 4 Individual country fixed effects estimates for bilateral exports 
COEFFICIENT Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Morocco Tunisia Turkey 
EU-Association Agreement 
 
0.303 -0.652*** -0.0397 -0.160 -0.175 -0.379*** 
  
[0.27] [0.088] [0.20] [0.097] [0.12] [0.078] 
EFTA 
  
-0.742*** -1.398*** -0.170 
 
-0.470*** 
   
[0.099] [0.49] [0.14] 
 
[0.12] 
AMU 1.803*** 
   
1.527*** 0.392* 
 
 
[0.59] 
   
[0.48] [0.23] 
 ACC 
 
0.307 
 
1.238*** 
   
  
[0.25] 
 
[0.36] 
   Israel-Turkey 
  
0.517*** 
   
0.826*** 
   
[0.10] 
   
[0.11] 
Jordan-Morocco 
   
1.274** -0.476** 
  
    
[0.51] [0.19] 
  Morocco-Tunisia 
    
-1.483*** -0.158 
 
     
[0.32] [0.17] 
 Egypt-Syria 
 
-0.364*** 
   
-0.178 
 
  
[0.11] 
   
[0.21] 
 Egypt-Jordan 
 
-1.133*** 
 
0.339 
   
  
[0.31] 
 
[0.31] 
   Egypt-Morocco 
 
0.693*** 
  
0.470** 
  
  
[0.22] 
  
[0.22] 
  Jordan-Tunisia 
   
0.767 
 
-1.627*** 
 
    
[0.55] 
 
[0.30] 
 Other Arab FTAS 
 
2.218*** 
 
-0.468*** -0.464** 
  
  
[0.48] 
 
[0.17] [0.24] 
  FTAS with CEECs 
  
-0.0581 
   
0.417*** 
   
[0.10] 
   
[0.10] 
FTAS with American Partners 
  
-0.111* 2.478*** 
   
   
[0.061] [0.22] 
   Yi (partner) 2.257*** 3.791*** -0.218 1.548*** 2.468*** 1.785*** 0.525 
 
[0.61] [0.38] [0.45] [0.46] [0.29] [0.42] [0.32] 
Yj (reporting) -3.144*** 2.496*** 1.401*** 0.802** -0.623 1.137 5.832*** 
 
[0.67] [0.86] [0.53] [0.32] [0.65] [0.71] [0.64] 
K/Li (partner) -0.340 -3.724*** 1.543*** -0.461 -1.510*** -0.714* -0.312 
 
[0.58] [0.36] [0.42] [0.44] [0.27] [0.38] [0.30] 
K/Lj (reporting)  2.899*** -3.709** 0.422 0.760 1.916 -0.790 -4.852*** 
 
[0.92] [1.52] [1.06] [0.55] [1.23] [1.10] [1.08] 
Constant 7.252 -96.75*** -43.88*** -57.09*** -32.74*** -49.87*** -111.6*** 
  [11.6] [8.65] [2.69] [8.28] [5.49] [7.16] [5.49] 
Observations 2068 2917 2891 2272 2904 2593 3194 
R-squared 0.73 0.83 0.89 0.78 0.84 0.80 0.89 
Hausman 5.904 66.15*** 
 
5682*** 
 
37.56*** 35.73*** 
F test FE 3206*** 116.7*** 160.2*** 1038*** 1133*** 32971*** 164.1*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets, .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specifications include fixed effects for partner country. The time dummies are not included due to obvious collinearity with 
reporting country GDP. Missing Hausman statistics indicate non positive definite matrix of coefficient differences used for 
testing 
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Table 5 Pooled panel estimates (arable land per capita as K/L proxy) 
Import Export 
COEFFICIENT FE 2FE D2FE FE 2FE D2FE 
EU-Association Agreement 0.244*** 0.376*** 0.375*** -0.297*** -0.258*** -0.151 
 
[0.077] [0.091] [0.085] [0.080] [0.099] [0.095] 
EFTA 0.332** 0.999*** 0.886*** -0.417** 0.137 0.157 
 
[0.17] [0.18] [0.17] [0.17] [0.20] [0.19] 
AMU 0.688*** 0.183 -0.160 1.110*** 1.083*** 0.731*** 
 
[0.22] [0.20] [0.19] [0.22] [0.21] [0.20] 
ACC 0.851 0.501 0.269 0.874 0.528 0.269 
 
[0.74] [0.89] [0.82] [0.76] [0.96] [0.91] 
Israel-Turkey 1.318*** 1.900*** 1.906*** 0.828* 0.585 0.688 
 
[0.42] [0.46] [0.43] [0.44] [0.50] [0.47] 
Jordan-Morocco 1.032** 0.622 0.429 0.518 0.659 0.542 
 
[0.46] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.57] [0.54] 
Morocco-Tunisia -0.405 0.778 0.979* -1.040** -0.587 -0.359 
 
[0.47] [0.54] [0.50] [0.49] [0.59] [0.56] 
Egypt-Syria -0.101 0.391 0.682 -0.518 0.816 1.097** 
 
[0.46] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.57] [0.53] 
Egypt-Jordan 0.471 0.337 0.328 -0.0233 -0.136 -0.0539 
 
[0.47] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.57] [0.54] 
Egypt-Morocco 0.984** 0.368 0.420 0.607 1.077* 1.119** 
 
[0.46] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.57] [0.54] 
Jordan-Tunisia -0.0404 0.685 0.731 -0.595 0.470 0.595 
 
[0.46] [0.52] [0.48] [0.48] [0.57] [0.54] 
Other Arab FTAS 0.352 0.340 0.335 0.773*** 0.609* 0.727** 
 
[0.28] [0.30] [0.28] [0.28] [0.33] [0.31] 
FTAS with CEECs 0.632*** 0.596*** 0.532*** 0.653*** 0.582*** 0.560*** 
 
[0.19] [0.19] [0.18] [0.20] [0.21] [0.20] 
FTAS with American Partners -0.144 0.750** 0.756*** 0.337 0.525 0.633** 
 
[0.36] [0.31] [0.29] [0.38] [0.34] [0.32] 
Yi (partner) 1.280*** 1.198*** -0.0120 0.824*** 0.785*** 0.276 
 
[0.073] [0.090] [0.27] [0.073] [0.095] [0.28] 
Yj (reporting) 2.252*** 1.697*** 1.563*** 2.832*** 2.732*** -0.446 
 
[0.17] [0.20] [0.38] [0.18] [0.22] [0.42] 
K/Li (partner) -0.268*** -0.327*** -0.523*** -0.442*** -0.419*** -0.587*** 
 
[0.088] [0.11] [0.11] [0.089] [0.11] [0.12] 
K/Lj (reporting)  0.538*** 0.820*** 0.562*** 0.0683 0.101 -0.00933 
 
[0.12] [0.14] [0.14] [0.13] [0.16] [0.16] 
DISTANCEij 
 
-0.792*** -0.831*** 
 
-1.484*** -1.543*** 
  
[0.044] [0.043] 
 
[0.047] [0.047] 
CONTIGUITYij 
 
0.793*** 0.804*** 
 
-0.0533 -0.0624 
  
[0.11] [0.11] 
 
[0.12] [0.12] 
COLONYij 
 
0.304*** 0.260** 
 
0.683*** 0.648*** 
  
[0.11] [0.10] 
 
[0.12] [0.11] 
COLONIZERij 
 
0.669*** 0.826*** 
 
0.432*** 0.499*** 
  
[0.059] [0.061] 
 
[0.061] [0.063] 
ARABICij 
 
0.855*** 0.683*** 
 
0.882*** 0.799*** 
  
[0.057] [0.058] 
 
[0.059] [0.060] 
TURKISHij 
 
-1.752*** -1.342*** 
 
-0.797* -0.418 
  
[0.41] [0.40] 
 
[0.43] [0.41] 
Constant -78.71*** -57.21*** 17.27 -84.01*** -69.48*** 11.79*** 
  [4.50] [5.61] [30165] [4.73] [6.39] [1.10] 
Observations 18190 18190 15972 18503 18503 16272 
R-squared 0.37 0.74 0.75 0.25 0.69 0.69 
Hausmann 211.3*** 
  
111.5*** 
  F test FE 22.59*** 49.42*** 194.5*** 22.20*** 33.18*** 149.5*** 
F test TD 7.471*** 3.520*** 5.502*** 6.878*** 3.841*** 8.717*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Arable land per capita as K/L proxy in all specifications. FE – fixed effects (pairs), 2FE – fixed effects for reporting and 
partner country. D2FE specifications include GDP expressed in changes and fixed effects for reporting and partner 
country. All specifications include time dummies (TD) 
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Table 6 Individual country fixed effects estimates for bilateral imports (arable land 
as K/L proxy) 
COEFFICIENT Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Morocco Tunisia Turkey 
EU-Association Agreement 
 
-0.346*** -0.00414 0.0297 0.376*** 0.279*** 0.356*** 
  
[0.11] [0.081] [0.10] [0.10] [0.087] [0.075] 
EFTA 
  
0.0589 -0.628 0.926*** 
 
-0.0611 
   
[0.13] [0.46] [0.29] 
 
[0.16] 
AMU 0.855 
   
1.291** 0.282 
 
 
[0.61] 
   
[0.52] [0.34] 
 ACC 
 
1.344*** 
 
0.185 
   
  
[0.38] 
 
[0.19] 
   Israel-Turkey 
  
1.551*** 
   
0.343** 
   
[0.17] 
   
[0.14] 
Jordan-Morocco 
   
0.538*** 1.187*** 
  
    
[0.18] [0.46] 
  Morocco-Tunisia 
    
-0.449 -0.226 
 
     
[0.28] [0.19] 
 Egypt-Syria 
 
0.393** 
   
0.193 
 
  
[0.19] 
   
[0.14] 
 Egypt-Jordan 
 
0.872*** 
 
0.611** 
   
  
[0.34] 
 
[0.26] 
   Egypt-Morocco 
 
1.080*** 
  
1.175*** 
  
  
[0.22] 
  
[0.25] 
  Jordan-Tunisia 
   
-0.899*** 
 
1.456** 
 
    
[0.27] 
 
[0.58] 
 Other Arab FTAS 
 
0.860*** 
 
0.514** -0.137 
  
  
[0.32] 
 
[0.23] [0.55] 
  FTAS with CEECs 
  
0.288*** 
   
0.455*** 
   
[0.11] 
   
[0.13] 
FTAS with American Partners 
  
-0.378*** -0.362*** -0.108 
  
   
[0.094] [0.11] [0.14] 
  Yi (partner) 1.405*** 0.848*** 1.659*** 1.005*** 0.923*** 1.607*** 1.308*** 
 
[0.26] [0.20] [0.24] [0.19] [0.18] [0.24] [0.24] 
Yj (reporting) 3.745*** 0.205 0.219 0.664** 0.910*** -0.642 4.193*** 
 
[0.76] [0.21] [0.59] [0.31] [0.33] [0.41] [0.56] 
K/Li (partner) 0.204 -0.172 -0.285 -0.475** -0.890*** 0.145 -0.152 
 
[0.29] [0.22] [0.26] [0.20] [0.22] [0.22] [0.25] 
K/Lj (reporting)  6.964*** 1.048** -0.437 1.015*** 1.846** -0.183 5.477*** 
 
[1.08] [0.53] [1.09] [0.20] [0.81] [0.64] [1.05] 
Constant -111.0*** -18.51*** -40.41*** -29.95*** -38.09*** -14.18 -130.7*** 
  [18.4] [3.03] [12.9] [6.99] [7.29] [8.64] [14.7] 
Observations 2554 2720 2339 2294 2732 2676 2875 
R-squared 0.78 0.85 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.83 0.86 
Hausman 7.545 6.205 5.959 3.581 14.28 178.2*** 
 F test FE 1441*** 199.3*** 62185*** 20016*** 5086*** 821.7*** 827.7*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets, .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Arable land per capita as K/L proxy. Specifications include fixed effects for partner country. The time dummies are not 
included due to obvious collinearity with reporting country GDP. Missing Hausman statistics indicate non positive definite 
matrix of coefficient differences used for testing 
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Table 7 Individual country fixed effects estimates for bilateral exports (arable land as 
K/L proxy) 
COEFFICIENT Algeria 
Egypt , 
Arab Rep. Israel Jordan Morocco Tunisia Turkey 
EU-Association Agreement 
 
-0.211 -0.459*** -0.0408 -0.367*** -0.263** -0.423*** 
  
[0.28] [0.072] [0.21] [0.099] [0.11] [0.063] 
EFTA 
  
-0.588*** -1.406*** -0.293** 
 
-0.482*** 
   
[0.091] [0.49] [0.14] 
 
[0.12] 
AMU 1.793*** 
   
1.713*** 0.458* 
 
 
[0.59] 
   
[0.48] [0.24] 
 ACC 
 
0.509** 
 
1.153*** 
   
  
[0.23] 
 
[0.37] 
   Israel-Turkey 
  
0.516*** 
   
0.862*** 
   
[0.10] 
   
[0.12] 
Jordan-Morocco 
   
1.269** -0.498** 
  
    
[0.51] [0.22] 
  Morocco-Tunisia 
    
-1.690*** -0.181 
 
     
[0.34] [0.17] 
 Egypt-Syria 
 
-0.610*** 
   
-0.113 
 
  
[0.13] 
   
[0.21] 
 Egypt-Jordan 
 
-0.668** 
 
0.402 
   
  
[0.33] 
 
[0.31] 
   Egypt-Morocco 
 
0.562** 
  
0.605*** 
  
  
[0.25] 
  
[0.22] 
  Jordan-Tunisia 
   
0.749 
 
-1.459*** 
 
    
[0.54] 
 
[0.30] 
 Other Arab FTAS 
 
2.249*** 
 
-0.273* 0.544*** 
  
  
[0.51] 
 
[0.14] [0.20] 
  FTAS with CEECs 
  
0.122 
   
0.398*** 
   
[0.10] 
   
[0.099] 
FTAS with American Partners 
  
-0.0108 2.460*** 
   
   
[0.068] [0.23] 
   Yi (partner) 1.743*** 0.252 1.240*** 0.976*** 0.839*** 1.007*** 0.199 
 
[0.39] [0.20] [0.19] [0.25] [0.13] [0.23] [0.15] 
Yj (reporting) -0.0937 2.039*** -0.0356 0.947** 0.467 0.498 1.949*** 
 
[1.09] [0.23] [0.47] [0.40] [0.30] [0.44] [0.41] 
K/Li (partner) -0.423 -1.199*** 0.546** -0.407 -1.084*** -0.111 -0.0510 
 
[0.51] [0.22] [0.22] [0.26] [0.19] [0.25] [0.18] 
K/Lj (reporting)  3.565** 2.260*** -2.268*** 0.0602 -0.724 -0.836 -2.822*** 
 
[1.49] [0.54] [0.86] [0.26] [0.73] [0.72] [0.75] 
Constant -32.08 -50.21*** -19.29** -47.96*** -33.00*** -32.27*** -46.74*** 
  [26.5] [2.95] [9.60] [8.14] [6.61] [9.24] [10.7] 
Observations 2034 2865 2831 2226 2858 2551 3138 
R-squared 0.73 0.83 0.88 0.78 0.84 0.80 0.90 
Hausman 9.274* 24.07*** 10.24 
  
25.51*** 1256*** 
F test FE 2076*** 77.20*** 185.5*** 975.6*** 957.9*** 7665*** 180.6*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets, .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Arable land per capita as K/L proxy. Specifications include fixed effects for partner country. The time dummies are not 
included due to obvious collinearity with reporting country GDP. Missing Hausman statistics indicate non positive definite 
matrix of coefficient differences used for testing 
 
